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This article proposes a theoretical reﬂection on the conditions for the constitution of a
distinction between the self and the world by a cognitive system. The main hypothesis is
the following: proprioception, as a sensory system that is habitually dedicated essentially
to experience of the body, is conceived here as a coupling which is necessary for the
dual and concomitant constitution of a bodily self and of a distal perceptual ﬁeld. After
recalling the singular characteristics of proprioceptive coupling, three lines of thought are
developed.The ﬁrst, which is notably inspired by research on sensory substitution, aims at
emphasizing the indispensable role of action in the context of such perceptual learning. In
a second part, this hypothesis is tested against opposing arguments. In particular, we shall
discuss, in the context of what Braitenberg called a synthetic psychology, the emergence
of oriented behaviors in simple robots that can be regulated by sensory regulations which
are strictly external, since these robots do not have any form of “proprioception.” In the
same vein, this part also provides the opportunity to discuss the argument concerning a
bijective relation between action and proprioception; it has been argued by others that
because of this strict bijection it is not possible for proprioception to be the basis for the
constitution of an exteriority. The third part, which is more prospective, suggests that it
is important to take the measure of the phylogenetic history of this exteriority, starting
from unicellular organisms. Taking into account the literature which attests the existence
of proprioception even amongst the most elementary living organisms, this leads us to
propose that the coupling of proprioception to action is very primitive, and that the role we
propose for it in the co-constitution of an exteriority and self is probably already at work in
the simplest living organisms.
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INTRODUCTION
Inspired by the conjunction between the traditions of construc-
tivism and phenomenology, which has been formulated and
elaborated recently in the framework of the paradigm of enac-
tion (Varela et al., 1991), this article proposes a reﬂection on
the conditions for the constitution of a double perceptual polar-
ity: that of the self (mainly a bodily self here), and that of a
structured exteriority. In other words, how it is that a cogni-
tive agent manages to constitute a “referential impression” of the
lived world at the same time that it speciﬁes itself. This con-
stitution, or the genesis of a structured experience, comprises
two aspects: the ﬁrst concerns the fundamental properties of the
objects that are co-constructed (self and/or world), such as sub-
stantiality, distality, ﬁgurability, tangibility, or yet again a sense
of sameness; the second concerns the properties of the percep-
tual ﬁeld itself as well as its englobing character (the fact that
the agent experiences the feeling of being inside). We will not
here exhaustively address all these properties. Rather, we propose
to focus on the initial and generic conditions for this constitu-
tion of an organized process of appearing: ﬁrstly at the level of
perceptual consciousness; and then at the level of a generalizing,
imaginative, and anticipatory consciousness. First of all, we will
recall the importance of “bodily action” as action produced by
an agent, and inducing sensory effects at the level of the same
agent. This activity, conceived as sensory-motor or kinesthetic
coupling, characterizes the concrete and continuous mode of rela-
tion that the agent entertains with its body and its environment
(the dimension of what is present). The role of this coupling
is to introduce a necessary variation which will form the basis
for an activity of synthesis which will allow not only for feeling
but also for the appearance of objects. A reminder of the sit-
uation of sensory substitution will serve as an example for this
aspect.
Then – and this will be at the heart of this article – when one
wishes to account for the constitution of the distinction between
the self and the world, there is a necessity for the acting agent to
make a distinction between two sources of variation in the sensory
signals that affect it: those that are related to its own activity, and
those that arise from the environment (considering that the per-
ceived organization of this environment is not pre-deﬁned). We
may note that an absence of distinction, or a confusion, between
these two sorts of signal directly threatens the agent since it favors
the constitution of erroneous perceptions which may be deleteri-
ous, and are at the very least unsettling as in the case of illusions of
vection and self-motion. Thus, going further toward a deﬁnition
of the mechanisms of the constitution of this phenomenological
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dissociation between self and world, we propose a mechanism of
“ﬁltering and calibration” which allows an agent, when its sen-
sory organs are submitted to variations in their states, to be able
to attribute these variations either to its own activity (and thus
as effects of its actions), or to events over which it has no con-
trol. In this way we develop the hypothesis, following on from
the reﬂections of Poincaré (1902, p. 84) on the construction of
perceptual and conceptual space, that the singularity of proprio-
ception lies in the fact that it is a ﬁrmreference-pointwhich enables
this process able to play this role of “ﬁltering and calibrating”
(Declerck and Gapenne, 2009; Gapenne, 2010a,b; Blanchard et al.,
2013). This will lead us to reﬂect upon the organized behaviors
of certain artiﬁcial agents which do not possess proprioception,
and to critically discuss theses which claim that it is possible
to constitute spatiality solely on the basis of external sensory
inputs.
Finally, in conclusion, we will redeﬁne action as not being
limited to the motor dimension of effective action, but as deriv-
ing from an organization where performance and sensation are
necessarily coupled, and to postulate that motor-proprioceptive
coupling plays a foundational role in the construction and the
genesis of the enactive process of partitioning the self and the
world, the inside and the outside, and so on.
ACTION-SENSATION COUPLING IN SENSORY
SUBSTITUTION
Amongst the various ﬁelds of research which have conﬁrmed the
importance of embodiment and action, as starting-points for
the constitution of a process of appearing, the work of Bach y
Rita in the 1960s on sensory substitution by means of a spe-
cial device (TVSS: tactile vision sensory substitution) holds a
prime place (Bach Y Rita, 1972). By actively using this device
(see below for a detailed description), blind or blindfolded par-
ticipants are able to perceive distal events (the position and the
form of a 3D object) as in vision and to improve signiﬁcantly
their performances (discriminate objects in a scene and manage
the interposition) by learning. Right from the start, many authors
such as Paillard (1971) did not fail to emphasize the interest of
this work, which opens up the possibility for the precise experi-
mental study of the genesis of a form of perception which derives
from action. This study appeared all the more original in that
it mobilized proximal sense-organs (in this case, tactile sensor)
in the constitution of an experience of an object at a distance
without any direct contact. Although many summaries of these
studies have already been published (e.g., Kaczmarek et al., 1991),
we consider that it is useful to reformulate here the principle of
sensory substitution. Technically, sensory substitution requires the
insertion of an activator or stimulator (or a whole set of acti-
vators or stimulators) as an intermediary between two sensory
systems, one artiﬁcial and the other natural. In other words, the
“substitution” involves a doubling of the stimulation and thus
a doubling of the transduction1: an artiﬁcial transduction (via
1This generic term designates any mechanism which performs the conversion of a
signal of one sort into an equivalent signal of another sort. Thus, any sort of sensory
organ (photoreceptor, semi-circular canal, or whatever) performs a transduction,
which is different for each of them.
a sensory device = transduction 1), and a natural transduction
(via a functional sensory system = transduction 2). This double
transduction, via the insertion of an artiﬁcial captor and activa-
tor, makes it possible to provide access to a sensory ﬂow which
would not be available without this technical mediation. In the
pioneering work of Bach-y-Rita et al. (1969) on the TVSS, it was a
question of providing blind persons with access to an optical ﬂow,
via a camera (transduction1),with electro-mechanical stimulators
which relayed the signal from the camera and stimulated natural
sensory organs which were available, i.e., the tactile receptors of
the skin (transduction 2). As can be appreciated immediately, and
as many subsequent developments have shown in practice (for rel-
atively recent reviews see Wall and Brewster, 2006; Visell, 2009),
this principle of substitution can theoretically substitute any sort of
ﬂowby any other (visual–auditory, auditory–tactile, tactile–tactile,
etc).
However, the use of these instruments rapidly revealed that
the substitution is not limited to this double transduction in the
sense of a two-stage transfer of input signals to the nervous system.
Firstly, it is imperative that the signals that are transmitted should
be subject to variation. Secondly, and this is the really essential
point, the “substitution” only becomes effective if this variation
is amenable to interpretation; and the key condition for this is
that the variation in question should be determined by the user.
It must therefore be well understood that the constitution of the
properties, and in particular the spatial properties of the ﬂow that
is substituted (for example, vision being substituted by the tactile
modality) does not derive from simply capturing the spatiality
inherent in the organization of the network of activators which
deliver the signals (for example, a square 20 x 20 matrix of 400
activators in the case of the TVSS). In this sense, the logic of
the constitution of perceptual experience, and more generally of
cognitive experience, via this type of device cannot be limited
solely to the double transduction of signals whose variation arises
from external events. This variation must be an active variation,
i.e., the variation must be produced and controlled by the agent.
Thus, the “substitution,” as a process which is equipped, must also
include the tool of an inverse double transduction corresponding
to the action produced by the body with respect to the instrument,
an action producing a movement of the instrument with respect
to the environment.
It is thus essential to understand that the “substitution” cannot
be solely sensory; this has led us to propose that the substitution is
rather perceptual, in the sense that it involves a moto-sensory2
coupling whose closure is ensured by the technical system on
one hand and the user on the other. In addition – and this is
in a way a consequence of the preceding point – the process
involved is not properly speaking a “substitution,” but rather
what we have called a “supplementation” (Lenay et al., 2003),
this latter term being conceptually more adequate. And as a
matter of fact, the system that is called “tactile–visual substi-
tution” does not give rise to a truly visual experience as such.
2Although the term “sensory-motor” is more frequent in the literature, we prefer
here the inverse formula, besides having the merit of emphasizing the primacy of
the action, it also afﬁrms both its role in producing variation in the sensory input,
and the importance of the agency of the movement.
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The instrument, in particular when it is actively taken in hand,
opens up an unprecedented space of experience, which makes
it possible to interpret certain properties of the “novel” moto-
sensory ﬂow. And in the case of the TVSS, it is remarkable
that the instrumented activity makes it possible to interpret
distal spatial qualities on the basis of proximal tactile signals.
Guarniero (1974) evidences that after several hours of use, a
blind user is able to recognize simple objects at a distance,
including moving objects, and to interpret certain events as
interpositions.
A ﬁnal point that is worth mentioning is that the stimuli deliv-
ered by the tactile stimulators are not forces of a sort which would
constrain the movements of the subject; this is in contrast to
devices such as the robotic arm PHANToM Desktop. With the
TVSS, the stimulation consists of a pressure on the skin, but it
does not deliver a return of effort of a kind which could guide the
movement. This is an essential point because, although it involves
a tactile activator, the TVSS is an interface which is “gestural,” and
in this sense much closer to visual gestures. Indeed, the move-
ments of the ocular globe are produced without any constraint
from the optical ﬂow, since this ﬂow does not deliver any forces
such that themovement of the ocular globewould bemechanically
affected and guided. In other words, the tactile stimulations of the
TVSS do not directly constrain the movements of the agent. Thus,
in the two cases, the control of the movement must be actively
produced by the agent – and this is a quite general situation. In
this context, a gesture (an organized exploratory movement) can
be minimally described as an attractor where each state must be
deﬁned by at least two parameters: a deﬁnite position of the point
of action in (x, y, z) co-ordinates; and a value of the sensation (0 or
1) indicating the absence or presence of an event in the environ-
ment. The temporal succession of these states (x,y,z,e) describes
a trajectory that we may deﬁne as a “gesture,” or alternatively as
a “strategy” (Stewart and Gapenne, 2004). In this situation, what
the subject receives at each point in time is just a sensation (or a
set of sensations), and the mere projection of this sensation onto
the sensory organ is not sufﬁcient to initiate perceptual activity.
If the subjects do succeed in perceiving “objects,” it can only be
through their active exploration, and by integrating over time their
movements, the tactile sensations, and their kinesthetic sensations.
Thus, the situation of perceptual supplementation is exemplary
because, quite besides the technical innovation, itmakes it possible
to re-create at a micro-developmental scale a situation of percep-
tual learning. Even though this learning does not have exactly the
same meaning for an adult and for a newborn child, we can nev-
ertheless follow through the necessary steps for the mastery of a
new mode of coupling.
In another technical context, inspired by the work of Meijer
(1992), Auvray et al. (2005, 2007) has proposed a description of
the steps involved in the appropriation of a device by sighted adult
subjects. Without going into the ﬁne details of the succession of
all these stages, let us consider the ﬁrst two which are of particular
interest here. The ﬁrst stage is called “contact”; it involves learn-
ing the sensory-motor regularities necessary to stabilize and to
actively maintain perceptual contact with the stimulus. As for the
second stage, labeled “distal attribution,” it corresponds to under-
standing the origin of the sensations as deriving from the fact of
making contact with an object situated in the perceptual space
opened up by the tool. This second stage is perhaps unfortunately
labeled, since it risks confusing the fact that the variation in the
sensations has an origin which is distinct (i.e., not related to the
determination of my actions) as compared to an origin which is
spatially distant, which is of course not the same thing. In this
situation, as in the original experiment of Epstein et al. (1986),
the participants using a sensory substitution device but not being
informed about its functioning are asked for the nature of what
they perceived and had to make a choice among several scenarios
(e.g., “sensors, located on my head and hand, record the locations
of my head and hand and produce different stimulation intensity
levels whenever those locations change.” or “a camera, located in
front of me, detects both hand and head movements and sends a sig-
nal to the device whenever movement is initiated.”) that proposed
a rationale for what was happening. The point of interest is that
the subjects produce sensory variations as a result of their own
movements; but, taking into account the fact that the subjects
are ignorant as to the experimental setup, the situation remains
somewhat ambiguous so that the interpretation of the variation
in the stimuli is not necessarily that of a determination through
agency. And even when it is, the subjects have great difﬁculty in
considering that the source of these variations may be external
and distant. It is clearly apparent that whereas at the stage of con-
tact the subjects often succeed, in the experiments of Epstein et al.
(1986) and Auvray et al. (2005), in expressing their consciousness
of the relation between their actions and the reafferent sensations,
this is because the source is ﬁxed and cannot produce a stimula-
tion unbeknown to the subject if the latter is immobile and not
stimulated. Nevertheless, the sensitivity to the spatio-temporal
coincidence between the movement and the tactile reafference
does not seem to be so obvious to all the subjects. This point
is important, since it indicates that even in such favorable con-
ditions the interpretation in terms of agency is not guaranteed
with an external source, and it is necessary to introduce certain
conditions of manipulating the coupling (for example by giving
the possibility of interposing a screen between the sensory cap-
tor and the source) in order to lift the ambiguity (Auvray et al.,
2005).
To sum up this section, and referring to the work on sensory
substitution, we will note three main points. Firstly, modulo the
necessary movement by a suitably equipped agent, it is possible to
constitute a distinct, distal appearance. Secondly, this appearance
is not reducible to an analysis of the tactile sensations or of the
movements produced in order to determine them; in both cases,
the tactile and kinesthetic sensations are “forgotten” and replaced
by a consciousness focused on the events in the environment.
Thirdly, if the subjects are not informed about the properties of
the coupling system (for example the TVSS), and are not informed
about what there is to be perceived by specifying explicitly that
the source is clearly positioned “out there” at a distance, it seems
that the experience of agency is not guaranteed. This being so,
with respect to our question concerning the constitution of the
self/world distinction, the analyses which have been carried out so
far bymeans of the experiments of sensory substitution/perceptual
supplementation only provide us with partial answers as to the
conditions of this constitution.
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One of the reasons for this is that the studies in this domain
have been concerned above all with the constitution of the“object”
pole; the other pole, that of the “subject,” is referred to an implicit,
pre-reﬂexive register which at best plays a role of motivation, and
not really of exposition (Husserl, 1989). It is to be noted immedi-
ately here that the problem arises from the impossibility of having
simultaneous experience of the two poles; in fact, certain studies
have clearly shown that it is possible to have recourse to the prin-
ciple of sensory substitution in order to constitute/recover bodily
experiences (Tyler et al., 2003). In line with this, the “subject” pole
can also be recovered in this way, to the extent that it refers to
a kinesthetic, bodily experience. In this light, we come to real-
ize that there is a point which has remained obscure in all these
analyses: and this is, to understand how the sensory ﬂow gener-
ated by the active movement by the agent, which determines the
variation in the ﬂow, can actually be partitioned by the agent.
One way to lift the veil of mystery would be to consider that
the deployment of each movement is always associated with a
double reafferent ﬂow (here, a tactile ﬂow and a proprioceptive
ﬂow). One of these reafferent ﬂows (the tactile ﬂow) would be
contingent, and the other one (the proprioceptive ﬂow) would
be absolute – at least to a ﬁrst approximation. The hypothesis
would then be that the proprioceptive system contributes to a
ﬁltering, since it provides the agent with a non-ambiguous indi-
cation as to whether he/she is active or not. We shall develop
this hypothesis and make it more precise in the next section. In
order to close the present section, we will remark again that if
the tool can be “forgotten” when it contributes to the accession
to an experience of the self and/or an exteriority, this “forget-
ting” also concerns the tactile sensations as such. It would seem
interesting to delve more deeply into this “disappearance from
experience” which occurs at the level of receptors such as the
retina or the cochlea. In the case of a prolonged and intensive
use of the TVSS, would one arrive at a stage when the tac-
tile sensations would have become just as inaccessible as retinal
sensations?
THE SINGULARITY OF PROPRIOCEPTION
In the matter of proprioception, it is important to be very precise
(Stillman, 2002). Only too often, and wrongly, “proprioception”
is misleadingly over-represented as the perception of self as an
embodied, acting agent. But it is obvious, as indicatedby theunfor-
tunate expression “proprioceptive function” as coined by Gibson,
that this sort of perception of bodily activity and the self involves
many (and indeed, a priori, all) perceptual systems. For this rea-
son, rather than the term “proprioceptive function,” we prefer the
term “kinesthetic function” which does properly refer to the mul-
timodal experience of the body at rest or in movement, static or
dynamic. We will reserve the term“proprioception”as one speciﬁc
perceptual system among others, which is indeed involved in the
experience (and the regulation) of movement, posture and bal-
ance; but as we shall see, proprioception also does more than this.
Anatomically, the proprioceptive system mobilizes sensory organs,
afferent innervations, and speciﬁc cortical structures which are
known in part today (McCloskey, 1978; Hogervorst and Brand,
1998; Romaiguère et al., 2003). A notable feature of this system
is that all the sensory organs are localized in the core of effectors
(muscles, tendons, articulations) involved in the maintenance and
the animation of the skeleton. It is thus a case not just of rel-
ative proximity, but of genuine contiguity between the sensory
organ and the effector. It is thus important to understand that
variation in the activity of the proprioceptive organs (neuromus-
cular spindles, neurotendinous organs, or articulatory receptors),
variation which is necessary for them to function, is intimately
related to variation in the activity of the effector itself. This has
led proprioception to be called “muscular sense” ever since its ﬁrst
description by Bell (1826), including mainly a sensitivity to move-
ment and to position. The speciﬁcity of proprioception derives
from the fact that all the other sensory organs respond to varia-
tions essentially linked to mechanical, chemical, optical, or other
ﬂows which come from the environment. More precisely, since a
living organism is never completely static (physiological tremor,
ocular micro-nystagmus), sensory organs can receive variations in
input whose amplitude cannot be directly related to the ampli-
tude of movements of the agent (Lockhead, 1992). The crucial
point here is thus that variation in the stimulation of all the sen-
sory organs, with the sole exception of proprioception, is linked
to bodily engagement but is always liable to be compounded with
the effects of events external to the agent. In other words, vari-
ation in the activity of the sensory organs, which is itself linked
to variation of their source, is always potentially composite and
ambiguous quite simply because the source of this variation is
potentially dual (and, in the event, almost always is dual since
there is a mix of variation due to the agent itself and variation
due to external events). The proprioceptive system thus has this
prime singularity, that it is always activated by deformations of
the body, and (in natural conditions) by nothing else. As exper-
imental studies in humans and animals have already suggested
empirically, the consequence of this is that if proprioception plays
an unquestionable role in the perception of bodily events (Farrer
et al., 2003), it can also play a role in the perception of external
events and, more fundamentally, in the genesis of the perception
of such events (Buisseret et al., 1988; Roll et al., 1991). We there-
fore suggest that by having at its disposal a moto-sensory system
strictly associated with its own activity, the agent possesses a pow-
erful tool for ﬁltering and calibrating signals for which it does not
control the determinism.
Philipona et al. (2003), far from any immediately phenomeno-
logical considerations, have taken up this line of argument on
a strictly formal basis, and have proposed an algorithm, based
on inputs and outputs, which is apparently able to deduce the
geometry and the dimensions of an external space without any
a priori knowledge. The calculating artifact (a virtual poly-
articulated robot) has at its disposal input signals coming from
two types of sensors: sensors which are sensitive to changes in
the positions of the articulated segments of the robot, and sen-
sors which are sensitive to the presence of light in the unknown
virtual environment. In addition, effector organs controlled by
the algorithm produce the movements of the robot. In the ﬁrst
instance, the algorithm distinguishes two types of signal accord-
ing to whether they are related to its own movements or not.
In other words, the algorithm can discriminate between extero-
ceptive signals which are produced when the robot is static, and
proprioceptive signals which possess a bijective relation with its
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own movement (“certain inputs react always in the same way
to motor command,” Philipona et al., 2003, p. 3). Then, in
a second instance, the robot (or rather its “brain”) is able to
distinguish between two sorts of exteroceptive signals: exaffer-
ent signals which are independent of its own movement (when
the robot is static and the sensors are subject to variations),
which enables the induction of a vector called “representation
of the state of the environment”; and signals which are associ-
ated with movements of the robot (whose sensors are subject
to variations related to reafferent signals), which enables the
induction of a vector called “representation of the exteroceptive
body.”
Now although this study does have the interest of proposing
a possible mathematical formulation of the distinctions which an
organism can make in order to perceive itself as different from its
environment, it has serious limitations. In particular, it does not
treat the case of a double source of stimulation when the robot is
in movement (a combination of exafferent and reafferent signals),
which is in the end the crucial situation for a living organism,
and which is at the core of the dilemma we have to deal with.
Moreover, the relation between proprioception and exteroceptive
reafferents is envisaged merely as a possible intersection. From our
point of view, the constitution of a genuine process of appearing
(i.e., the microgenesis of perception) requires a genuine articula-
tion, and not just a contingent intersection between entities that
are presupposed to be distinct. Finally, besides the hypothesis of
a bijective relation between action and sensation in the case of
proprioception (see below), and its limitation in this model to a
capture of position (even if movement and position are to some
extent correlated), the hypothesis that the motor commands –
which will prime the moto-sensory coupling and thus prime the
subsequent inferences realized by the “brain” – are produced “at
random” remains mysterious. Where do these commands come
from? Why do they take the form that they do? Are they generated
by a “program”? As I will say below, this conception of commands
as pure effectuation does not seem adequate in the case of living
organisms.
A second singularity of proprioception is that these sensors
do not seem to be submitted to the activity of an efferent sen-
sory system, as are all other sensory systems (e.g., Warr, 1975). In
addition, the activity of proprioceptive receptors does not seem
to be modulated by anything other than the activity of the effec-
tors to which they are linked. The receptors or the primary and
secondary sensory nerve-endings situated in the equatorial zone
of the muscular ﬁbers present a variation in their potential as
a function of the modulation of the tension of the muscular
tension. And even in the case of the gamma loop, the neu-
rons emanating from the anterior horn of the spinal cord are
moto-neurons which modulate the stretching of the ﬁbers, but
they are in no way sensory efferent ﬁbers which modulate the
activity of the sensory nerve-endings themselves. This anatom-
ical particularity has functional consequences. The activation
of afferent proprioceptive ﬁbers can modulate the behavior of
the receptors of other sensory systems via their action at the
level of central nuclei from which efferent ﬁbers leave toward
the other sensory receptors. Conversely, the other sensory sys-
tems are not able to carry out such a modulation, other than
indirectly via the modulation of the tension of the muscular
ﬁbers.
THE ABSENCE OF PROPRIOCEPTION AND THE BIJECTION
ACTION/PROPRIOCEPTION
In order to discuss the theoretical proposition formulated above
concerning the role of proprioception, and maybe to contest it, we
shall now consider two arguments which go against it: one of these
argument is empirical and factual, and the other is theoretical.
The ﬁrst argument refers to the possibility of producing spa-
tially organized behavior without any recourse to proprioception;
the second posits that the constitution of a space is impossi-
ble if it is admitted that the relation action-proprioception is
bijective.
Inhis essay in synthetic psychology, Braitenberg (1986)presents
some very simple robotic architectures based on direct con-
nections between sensors and effectors, which are nevertheless
sufﬁcient for the mobile robots to exhibit distinctive behaviors,
such as attraction and repulsion, with respect to a source. At no
point in his short and fascinating text does Braitenberg even so
much as mention the very idea of proprioception – which leads
him, in fact, to put forward some very internalist and repre-
sentationalist propositions. We may recall here that the famous
“tortoises” of Gray Walter (Machina Speculatrix) were likewise
bereft of any proprioception (they possessed only a shock-sensor),
and were already able to exhibit behavior such as “return to the
nest,” an “attractive” site where the tortoise could recharge its
energy; this site possessed a light which served as an external
source for guiding the tortoise. Let us consider then this case of a
displacement toward a source of light. The robots were equipped
with a photo-electric cell (a photo-sensitive sensor); detection of
the light was supposed to produce exploratory movements which
here were of two types, “translation” or “rotation.” The com-
position of these two sorts of movement produces a sinusoidal
(or ellipsoidal) trajectory, whose amplitude theoretically tends to
decrease as the robot approaches the source. What can we learn
from the emergent behaviors produced by these automata? It is
clearly a case of emergence, in the sense that the trajectory pro-
duced by the agent, and described by the observer, is in no way
programmed as such (even though it results from the operation
of an electronic circuit), and it is not learned. These behaviors
demonstrate that an agent, even an artiﬁcial agent, can produce
spatially organized behavior without any recourse to “proprio-
ceptive” signals concerning its own material architecture and its
own movement. This self-organization does however, have some
limits, in particular concerning the choice of the material archi-
tecture and the possibilities of action which are associated with
it. We may note that, unlike the virtual robot of Philipona et al.
(2003) described above, these robots do not have any propriocep-
tion and so the problem of “partitioning” simply does not arise.
Moreover, the problem of portioning “external” signals as arising
from the movement of the agent versus that of the environment
cannot be resolved by intersecting external and proprioceptive
ﬂows of sensation. So what, after all, does this tropism toward a
light-source tell us? It indicates that the action of the agent (the
activation of a motor producing the rotation of the wheels) can
be controlled by the capture of a contingent “external” signal on
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which feedback is applied. But then, with respect to our hypothesis
concerning the deleterious consequences of confusion concerning
the source of variation, why in the case of these robots does this
not cause totally aberrant behavior? When the photo-electric cell
is activated, the robot cannot “interpret” this activation as being
necessarily related to its own rotation (the light-source is ﬁxed),
because it does not have any signals concerning its own move-
ment. So what could possibly constitute a “pathological” behavior
in this case? This strictly external guidance of the actions which
are successively produced rests on the tolerance of a fusion of the
sources of contingency: the light-source can be displaced by the
experimenter, or the movement of the robot can produce a dis-
placement of the sensor, such that it is no longer in phase with
the source. And in fact, an examination of the concrete situa-
tions reveals that the regulation occurs in the succession of these
two modes of variation, and does not tolerate well their concur-
rence. However, and this is a key point, the great majority of
natural situations do expose the agents to the simultaneity of the
variations.
Of course, this tropism toward a light-source is reminiscent of
the way bacteria climb a glucose gradient; we will come back to
this point, to suggest that the management of this simultaneity
by a living organism is not of the same order as the Braitenberg
robots, and as in the case of micro-organisms, does not need a
central nervous system to be achieved.
The argument concerning the bijection action-sensation is in a
way the counterpoint to the preceding question. If one admits the
existence of an agent which would possess only proprioception,
such an agent would not be able to have access to any variations
other than those produced by its own actions, and it would there-
fore be in a situation where the variations are totally determined
(Piaget, 1937; Lenay, 2006). In this case, no opening toward the
exterior would be possible, and neither would an access to the
bodily self on the basis of the actual variations. This argument
is often invoked, on the one hand to afﬁrm that proprioception
alone, in and of itself, cannot open the way to spatiality; and on
the other hand, it constitutes a risk of a return to a representa-
tionalist conception of bodily experience. Both of these risks are
real. However, this hypothetical situation and the associated risks
should be put in due perspective. Firstly, there is no known liv-
ing organism whose organization is founded strictly and solely
on proprioception. All known living organisms do have two sorts
of sensors, those that are proprioceptive, the others which are
sensitive to events which are totally or partly independent of the
actions of the organism. The question is thus not so much that of
a total determinism of the moto-proprioceptive loop, but rather
that of the articulation between this loop and the others. Sec-
ondly, one can question the status of a possible bijection; and
also ask questions about the bijection itself. If the hypothetical
bijection supposes that the motor command, specifying a precise
value for a parameter of position, speed or other, has the effect of
producing a corresponding unique value at the level of the sen-
sor, this supposition postulates anew that the command/action
is a matter of pure effectuation, and tends to deny the impor-
tance of the differential of the activity of the sensor. As for the
bijection itself, it may be doubted whether it could ever actually
be realized, not only because the bandwidth for proprioceptive
sensors is limited and their response not so reliable (Wann and
Ibrahim, 1991), but also and above all because of the principle
of functional ambiguity which refers to the radical impossibility
for a command to totally anticipate the concrete realization of the
action. In particular, gravitation and friction always leave a certain
degree of uncertainty concerning the movement which will actu-
ally occur. These variations, which cannot be determined by the
command, are actually a condition for the possibility of consti-
tuting an experience of the body/self – even if, as we have already
said, this kinesthetic experience involves the set of sensory organs
as a whole.
LIFE AND THE SELF-WORLD DUALITY
In this article we have proposed that the constitution of an expe-
rience of the distinction between the self and the external world
supposes that the agent has at its disposal a way of coupling its
means of action and its means of sensation; the latter being sen-
sitive to variations in the signal that are related, or not, to the
effects of actions produced by the agent itself. We have also pos-
tulated that moto-proprioceptive coupling plays a decisive role in
this constitution, to the extent that it allows for the advent of a ref-
erent with respect to which other sensory signals can be sorted and
calibrated. We have insisted on this function of sorting, because
it seems to us to be indispensable, via action, in the constitution
of two distinct poles of experience, that of the subject and that
of the object. On this point, we wish to draw attention to the
fact that even the simplest forms of life (even before the advent
of a nervous system) possess both a system of action and a dou-
ble form of sensors (proprioceptive and others). Thus, we may
venture to suggest that the hypothesis we develop here, which is
valid for complex perceptual systems, actually corresponds to a
mechanism which is much more general and which is common
to all forms of life as they exist from the unicellular scale onward
(Iscla and Blount, 2012; Lebois et al., 2012). Thus life, in its pri-
mary organization, never exists in a pure feed-forward mode; pure
effectuation does not seem to exist; this is in the end compatible
with the circular forms of organization characteristic of the later
cybernetic approaches. It remains to launch an enquiry into the
genesis of the sensor/effector partition in the course of the advent
of life itself.
On this basis, and in coherent fashion at the theoretical level,
we are led to formulate the three following points:
(1) With reference to the theory of autopoiesis, the paradigm of
enaction poses that cognition implies an organization that is
proper to living organisms.
(2) This organization, which involves a characteristic circularity
at the level of metabolism (a network of elements which pro-
duce the elements necessary for its own functioning), replays
the scheme of circularity at the nascent sensory-motor level
in terms of the relation between effectors and sensors.
(3) The notion of action as pure effectuation no longer having a
place (outside the context of the mechanistic conception of
automata), it could give way to the concept of enaction which
is more favorable to an effort at the characterization of the
organization and the lived experience of living and thinking
agents.
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By way of conclusion, it appears that the next theoretical step
will aim at developing the conception of a form of enactive mem-
ory which escapes from the bounds of current coupling, without
reducing it to a simple representation that can be activated on an
occasional basis. Such a memory could be the basis for justifying
the appearance of the self and the world.
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